Reasons for the Dual Hat, and Reasons against – solution – it’s complicated.
The National Security Agency (NSA) and U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) are both part of the U.S. Department of Defense, with a single leader overseeing both agencies. CYBERCOM operates under Title 10, governing military operations, while the NSA operates under Title 50, governing intelligence activities. While distinct missions, in cyber operations they frequently intersect.
Intelligence Gathering: Strategic vs. Operational
Intelligence gathering often overlaps with operational activities when identifying threat actors. The methods and tactics used may be inherently operational or offensive, blurring the distinction between intelligence and military operations.
Intelligence has a history of intersecting with military action, as seen from within The DoD War Manual. Item 16.1.2.1 lists in Cyber Operations actions such as advance force, reconnaissance, and gathering of intelligence;1 identifying intelligence as a distinct act.
Splitting the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command would not change how cyber intelligence is gathered but could increase costs, create duplicative efforts and reduce efficiency.
To Split or Not
Post-Gathering: What to Do with the Intelligence?
The NSA’s directive to share intelligence with relevant agencies contrasts with CYBERCOM’s mission to disrupt and impose costs on adversaries. This divergence creates a conflict – who decides how the intelligence is used? For instance, if CYBERCOM wants to gather long-term intelligence or develop countermeasures without disclosure, it could clash with the NSA’s responsibility to share the data.
Splitting the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command would not change how cyber intelligence is gathered, would likely increase costs, and reduce operational efficiency. Maintaining the current dual-hat structure, however, may continue to create conflicts between the agencies’ differing missions, potentially complicating intelligence priorities.
Ultimately, the decision to split or consolidate involves weighing the trade-off between efficiency and resolving mission conflicts.
- DOD Law of War Manual, Updated July 2023, Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense ↩︎
References
Department of Defense. (2023, July). Office of General Counsel | Department of Defense | Treaty Documents > DoD Law of War Manual. Retrieved from Office of General Counsel | Department of Defesne: https://ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/Law%20of%20War%202023/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY 202023.pdf
Garamone, J. (2023, March 8). Cyber Command, NSA Successes Point Way to Future. Retrieved from U.S. Department of Defense: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3322765/cyber-command-nsa-successes-point-way-to-future/
House.Gov. (2025). TITLE 10 / Subtitle A / PART I / CHAPTER 6 / §167b. Retrieved from uscode.house.gov: https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section167b&num=0&edition=prelim
Maryuama, J. A. (2020, December 24). Split Up NSA and Cybercom. Retrieved from Defense One: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/12/split-nsa-and-cybercom/171033/
National Security Agency. (n.d.). About NSA/CSS Mission. Retrieved from NSA.gov: https://www.nsa.gov/about/mission-values/
Office of the Director of National Intelligence. (n.d.). Rev Book – 1947 National Security Act. Retrieved from Office of the Director of National Intelligence: https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-security-act-of-1947
Schoka, A. (2019, April 3). Cyber Command, The NSA, and Operating in Cyberspace: Tie To End The Dual Hat. Retrieved from War On The Rocks: https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/cyber-command-the-nsa-and-operating-in-cyberspace-time-to-end-the-dual-hat/
Swaney, R. (2023, September 11). Why Keep the Cybercom and NSA’s Dual Hat Arrangement. Retrieved from Security Intelligence: https://securityintelligence.com/articles/why-keep-cybercom-and-nsas-dual-hat-arrangement/